The safety of the passengers of flight DN288, operated by DAN Air on June 24, 2023, was not compromised!

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On June 24, 2023, DAN Air officials allegedly accused Romatsa and air traffic controllers of endangering their plane and the passengers of flight DN288. AIAS – The Civil Aviation Safety Investigation and Analysis Authority self-referred and made some checks. You can find the conclusions below!

Aircraft YR-DSE took off from Madrid on 24.06.2023/12/00 at 1:50 UTC 3 hour and 10 minutes late after 53 successive delay messages (at 11:10 UTC, 11:35 UTC and 17:40 UTC). It entered Romania's airspace at 14:40 (XNUMX:XNUMX UTC), when it requested successive changes to the flight direction to the southeast to avoid adverse weather conditions.

Aircraft YR-DSE bypassed the area to the south, then flew over TMA Bucharest and headed north, to enter the Brașov control area through the OBCAS point. Given that, at the time of entering Brașov Airport, there was another aircraft on the airport platform which was in the process of starting the engines (YR-SKY, flight number H41715, callsign HYS1715) and which had a take-off slot (18 p.m. :28)
allocated by EUROCONTROL, the aircraft YR-DSE was indicated to enter a waiting procedure at the vertical of Brașov airport.

The air traffic controller is responsible for observing the mandatory take-off time of the departing aircraft, in accordance with Regulation (EU) no. 255/2010.

The comparative evolution of the two aircraft in CTR Brașov is analyzed below:

  • At 18:24, aircraft YR-SKY requested and received approval for
    towing the aircraft and starting the engines.
  • At 18:26, YR-DSE clears the OBCAS point at FL165.
  • At 18:27 the first radio contact between the YR-DSE crew is recorded
    and the Brașov control tower, the aircraft passing through FL142, descending to FL110. Following radio contact, the pilot of aircraft YR-DSE is instructed to fly to the holding area above VOR VBV, which is confirmed by the pilot.

No message of non-compliance was communicated by the crew, nor was the existence of any factor that could have jeopardized the safety of the aircraft (such as the weather, the amount of fuel on board or the technical condition of the the aircraft), situations in which the request for a priority landing would have been justified.

In the case of flight DN288:

  • At the time of first radio contact with the tower, the aircraft was passing through FL142, which would have imposed an additional 4-5 minutes of time compared to previous flights.
  • If he had received clearance to perform ILS RWY21 at the very first radio contact with the tower and had been at FL105, the aircraft would have cleared the runway at 18:38 at the earliest. The YR-SKY aircraft had the take-off time (slot) allocated by EUROCONTROL at 18:28, with the possibility of a maximum delay of 10 minutes, i.e. no later than 18:38 (take-off time).
  • At 18:32:
    – YR-SKY commenced taxiing on Runway A to align with Runway 03 for take-off.
    – YR-DSE completes the turn into the holding area heading 030° at FL 099.
  • At 18:35:
    – YR-SKY has taken off and is at 3600 ft.
    – YR-DSE continues flight according to procedure in the holding area at FL 099.

At 18:37:
– YR-SKY is close to the exit from CTR Brașov;
– YR-DSE is on approach to VOR VBV and is cleared to begin ILS landing procedure RWY21.
– At 18:48, the aircraft YR-DSE lands on runway 21, and at 18:50 it is parked at position no. 1.

ANALYSIS done by AIAS – Civil Aviation Safety Investigation and Analysis Authority

Punctually, at the time of clearance for the take-off of aircraft YR-SKY, aircraft YR-DSE was not in any of the final stages of the approach, nor in any of the situations provided for in AMC19 at ATS.TR.210(a)(3) for you will be given priority on landing.

Regulation (EU) no. 255/2010 establishes, in art. 6, general obligations of air traffic services (ATS) units, including respecting departure slots and not granting take-off authorization to flights that do not respect the estimated departure time or whose flight plans have been rejected or suspended.

Thus, the tolerance of a departure slot is -5/+10 minutes compared to the time calculated for take-off 11, it remains the task of ATC to communicate and monitor compliance with this slot. In the present case, the reported slot for the take-off of the aircraft YR-SKY was 18:28. YR-SKY took off at 18:35 according to the slot allocated by EUROCONTROL (ie no later than 18:38).

If he had received clearance to initiate the standard ILS approach procedure RWY21 at the very first radio contact with the tower and had been at FL105 at the OBCAS point, the aircraft would have cleared the runway at 18:38 at the earliest.

The conclusion of the investigation

Given that the departure time of the YR-SKY aircraft could not exceed 18:38, there was a risk of both aircraft being blocked on the Brașov airport platform. The aircraft YR-SKY would have lost its take-off slot, and the aircraft YR-DSE, which was to perform another flight with a different crew, would not have been able to go through all the necessary procedures for take-off by 19:00, the operating time of Brasov airport.

In conclusion, from the information collected and analyzed, no elements were identified that would lead to the conclusion that the safety of the passengers of flight DN288 would have been endangered during the flight in the control area of ​​Brașov airport.

The entire report issued by AIAS - the Investigation and Analysis Authority for Civil Aviation Safety - can be found on the website.

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Will DAN Air from Romatsa apologize for the extremely serious accusations made without foundation?

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